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Abstract: With increasing numbers of young people participating in higher education in Ireland
and a heavy reliance of higher education institutions on State funding, the introduction of an
alternative finance system for Ireland has been muted over the past number of years. However,
no study has been conducted to gauge the potential impact of such measures. In this paper we
utilise a dynamic microsimulation model developed for Ireland to simulate the impact of both an
income contingent loan system (ICL) and a graduate tax system from a fiscal and redistributional
viewpoint and to analyse the repayment length under the former system. Our results suggest that
an ICL system could be more equitable, while the graduate tax system could be a better
alternative from a fiscal viewpoint. The results also illustrate the importance of the interest rate
attached to any future student loan system within Ireland from a fiscal viewpoint. 
I INTRODUCTION 
O
ver the past 15 years Ireland has experienced rapid growth in higher
education participation, with student numbers increasing from 86,624 to
155,000 in the period 1994 to 2010 and expected to grow to 204,000 by 2018
(Department of Education and Science, 2010). Within Ireland, the vast
majority of third level funding is provided by the State (85 per cent for the year
2007, OECD 2010). Given the high private returns to education (Barrett et al.,
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01 Flannery article_ESRI Vol 42-3  16/09/2011  09:58  Page 2372002) and the current difficult fiscal situation within Ireland, alternative
forms of higher education financing have been suggested by the OECD (2006),
the Department of Education and Science (2003) and the Higher Education
Authority (2011). The aim of this paper is to utilise a dynamic microsimulation
model for Ireland and explore the fiscal and redistributive implications of a
number of alternative higher education finance structures, with varying
assumptions regarding the parameters of these systems.
Since the mid-1990s there has been a general move by developed nations
towards shifting the burden of higher education costs upon the student and
away from the State. This is seen in Table 1 below, where the OECD average
State share of total expenditure on tertiary education over the period 1995-
2007 fell from 86 per cent to under 70 per cent. The only exception is Ireland,
where the public share has risen from 70 per cent to 85 per cent, due to the
free tuition fees initiative for undergraduates introduced in 1996. Before this,
the majority of undergraduate students had to pay tuition fees that were
based upon the manner of course being pursued and institute attended. These
fees were replaced with a much lower flat ‘registration fee’ which stood at
€190 (IR£150) in 1996, and has risen to €1,500 by 2010. The shortfall in
revenue for third level institutions this created was filled by government
finances and so a substantial shift towards reliance on State funding by these
institutions was created. 
Table 1: State Proportion of Total Tertiary Education Expenditure Across









OECD average 69.1 86
Source: OECD (2010).
Meeting the objective of increasing the percentage of the Irish labour force
with a third level qualification from 33 per cent in 2008 to 48 per cent in 2020
(Future Skills Needs, 2007) will require significant extra resources. In
addition, participation in higher education is not equal, with higher socio-
economic groups such as professional backgrounds having a disproportionate
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2001), using data on college entrants, highlighted that this pattern did not
change with the introduction of the free fees scheme.
Both a graduate tax scheme and an income contingent loan system have
been suggested as possible alternatives to the current free fees scheme with
the National Strategy for Higher Education to 20301 (2011) recommending
that the latter system be introduced in Ireland in the near future. In an
international context, empirical work has been carried out most notably for
the UK and Australia to gauge redistributive and fiscal implications of
introducing such systems. To date, no study has been conducted that attempts
to analyse the implications of an alternative higher education finance
structure in an Irish context 
In this paper we utilise a dynamic microsimulation model for Ireland and
explore the fiscal and redistributive implications of a number of alternative
higher education finance structures, with varying assumptions regarding the
parameters of these systems. In the next section we will provide a brief
overview of the economic theory behind the nature of funding for third level
education and also analyse the various finance options available for higher
education. We next investigate these options in an international context and
explore their applicability in an Irish setting. We then briefly outline LIAM,
the dynamic microsimulation model to be used. The methodology of simulating
two higher education finance structures using LIAM follows. We then present
our results and conclude.
II  STUDENT LOAN OPTIONS FOR HIGHER EDUCATION FINANCE
In understanding the impact of funding choice, the concepts of efficiency
and equity are important considerations (Barr, 1993). In terms of efficiency, an
examination of the private and social benefits and costs to higher education is
relevant in relation to the balance between public and private funding.
Graduates of higher education on average extract a significant private return
as a result of higher life-cycle earnings and greater employment prospects.2
Thus from an efficiency viewpoint, an individual should contribute towards
the costs of this education. However, both society and the State may also
derive benefits from more tertiary-education individuals due to positive
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such as lower crime (McMahon, 2004). Also, with specific reference to
externalities generated from higher education, Moretti (2004) shows evidence
that higher numbers of third level graduates can positively impact on wages
for those of lower education. As a result of these, there is an efficiency
justification for the State to subsidise the cost of participation. 
Inefficiencies may also arise due to market failure within education.
Imperfect capital markets combined with uncertain future gains from higher
education may entail that talented individuals pass all necessary tests to be
admitted to third level education but may not be able to afford to pay any
private charge on education, leading to enrolment inefficiencies. This market
failure can affect the equity of access perpetuating income inequalities. If
lower income groups are excluded from participating, the resulting differential
life-cycle earnings will lead to wealth inequalities in a society persisting.
Subsidies for higher education, by reducing the credit constraint faced by
students, may see more from the lower incomes participate. These may take
the shape of State funded policies such as means tested grants based upon
parental income, a range of scholarship programmes aimed specifically at
those from lower incomes or in the most extreme case, free higher education
may be offered to the entire population. In addition, the method of financing
influences the redistributive nature of the policy as does differentiation in
access due to non-monetary reasons. Studies such as those from Dynarski
(2003) and Carnerio and Heckman (2002) outline the potential importance of
these subsides in helping overcome the credit constraint those with lower
incomes may face when entering third level education. However, untargeted
subsidies such as free third level to all may effectively become transfers to the
rich if other barriers to entry by lower income groups to higher education
exist3 and are not overcome. Although Ireland does have a mean tested grant
system in place to cover tuition fees and some maintenance costs for those
with low income, Clancy (1997, 2001) and O’Connell (2006) note that the free
tuition scheme in Ireland, because of the persistent socio-economic participa  -
tion differentials, results in a net transfer to the top of the income distribution. 
2.1  Student Loan Options
We now discuss alternative higher education financing options. To help
achieve the goals of equity and efficiency and provide some private funding
within higher education finance a wide range of finance options for higher
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3 These may include a perceived low rate of return to higher education, high opportunity costs
and/or family and cohort influences, see Flannery and O’Donoghue (2009) for a discussion of these
in an Irish context.
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vouchers and tuition fee schemes exist within these options,4 in this paper the
focus is upon two main instruments of income contingent based finance
options, namely:
● Income contingent loans (ICL) with risk sharing and
● Graduate taxes. 
In this section we first outline the basic principles of a student loan system
and then describe in detail both a graduate tax and risk sharing ICL system.
A student loan system attempts to reduce credit constraints associated with
higher education participation and potentially reduces inequalities from State
funding of higher education. Students generally receive a loan to cover the cost
of their education with repayment made from labour market earnings, with
the repayments ending once the loan has been repaid in full or upon
retirement. There are two basic forms of student loans within this format with
the main distinction between whether the level of debt and/or the level of
repayments account for the income of the graduate. The type of student loan
system that will take account of the graduate’s income in some manner is
known as an income contingent loan (ICL) system, while those that do not are
known as mortgage style loans.5 A number of variants around these basic
tenets exist with Chapman (2005) and Barr (1993) presenting a detailed
discussion of these.6 However, gauged in terms of the proposals outlined
previously (HEA, 2009; Department of Education, 2003; Hayes, 2009), the
applicability in an Irish context, and for parsimony, it was decided this paper
will focus specifically upon the potential impact of a risk sharing ICL system
and a graduate tax system in Ireland. 
2.2  Income Contingency with Risk Sharing
A form of ICL that is typically associated with public financing is a risk
sharing ICL. With this system graduates are obligated to repay a maximum
amount in present value terms and entails that the size and frequency of
repayments are linked to income levels, with no repayments after the
individual has cleared his/her own debt. Within this structure the costs of non-
payment are shared by the taxpayer and the graduate. As the externalities
involved with higher education benefit society as a whole, placing some of the
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graduate will face some burden of default (d) as generally the loan they receive
will be augmented to reflect some probability of default; however, this will not
vary as he/she goes through their life cycle. Therefore, the graduate will
generally face repaying 
Payment = (1 + D) × t (1)
Where D is the default probability across the cohort and t is the initial loan
for tuition purposes and can be seen as MC-X, where MC is the marginal cost
of the education and X is the value of the externalities involved with extra
education. As noted earlier, the exact breakdown of the private/public
contributions to this debt is difficult to estimate, however, if all of these
parameters are set appropriately the government will receive the full tuition
loan t. If they have not it could be the case that taxpayers without higher
education pay more than they should,7 or they could see a revenue windfall,
depending on the total level of debt each student is burdened with and the
default rate. Although this system does generally entail some graduates will
pay more than others in terms of total repayments, sharing the risk of an ICL
with the taxpayer can help deal with problems of adverse selection and moral
hazard that may arise with different forms of ICL systems. For example, an
ICL with risk pooling is designed with a fixed total debt for members of
particular cohorts, usually designated by student’s year of enrolment. In this
system, although each student may receive the same loan amount, as the debt
is totalled across a cohort, some individuals may have to pay debts that are not
paid for by others in their cohort. This is because repayments are adjusted ex
post to take into account the repayment patterns of others in the cohort. This
results in a transfer of the default risk of the loan to those with higher future
incomes, who may end up repaying more than those with lower future incomes
as repayments are based as a fraction of future incomes (Chapman, 2005).
Therefore, as an ICL with risk sharing entails that the taxpayer and not the
graduate will meet the default, there is no danger for the borrower if his/her
future incomes rise. Therefore, it is unlikely that high ability students will opt
out of this system, and also graduates with higher incomes will have less of an
incentive to divert away from high paying jobs as the amount they repay is not
linked to the income of others in the cohort (Chapman, 2005). There still may
exist some issues of adverse selection with this system as those that expect
high earnings may still opt out to avoid paying Dt from Equation (1) above.
The problem of adverse selection can be reduced through a mandatory system
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sharing is generally seen as being administered by the government, it would
have the advantage of an efficient collection system through income taxation
or social insurance schemes. 
Various forms of income contingent loan systems have been introduced in
Australia, New Zealand and the UK respectively over the past 25 years with
an ICL system generally introduced to complement an existing means tested
grant scheme. Chapman (2005) notes that in Australia, evidence would
suggest that each has had no little or no affect on the composition of those
participating in higher education across social or income class in a positive or
negative manner, while the scheme resulted in eight billion Australian
dollars8 being raised during the period 1989-2001. Also, as the figures 
in Table 1 illustrate, it can be suggested that all these countries have
successfully placed some of the financial burden of higher education upon the
student, while removing some of the reliance on the State of tertiary education
funding. With particular reference to the UK, who introduced an ICL with risk
sharing system in 1997, we see the proportion of third level expenditure
coming from the State fell from 70 per cent in1995 to 36 per cent by 2007. The
UK has seen evidence similar to that of Australia with the introduction of the
scheme seemingly having no effect on the composition of those participating in
higher education across social or income class (UK Office for National
Statistics, 2004).9 Such evidence would seem to suggest that in an Irish
context, the introduction of a similar scheme may have a limited impact upon
the participation of those from lower incomes and help reduce the funding
reliance of third level institutions on the State. However, while the initial
system in the UK was designed with a flat, generic loan given to each
graduate, recent reforms such as those in 2007 and currently being
implemented as a result of the Browne report (2010) entail that graduates of
different courses and institutions will face varying amount of debt. This will
mean increased fees (and debt) for students (graduates) and thus increased
revenue for third level institutions and so may prove fiscally beneficial.
However, the effect upon student participation in the UK is unknown, with
research by Dearden et al. (2007) suggesting that such reforms may increase
participation levels by lower income groups if they are complemented with
reform/implementation of a higher education grant system. 
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Another income contingent instrument is a graduate tax system. While
most income tax systems are progressive and so higher educated individuals
with higher incomes will pay on average higher average tax rates, these
systems do not differentiate horizontally, so individuals with the same income
will pay (subject to other tax deductions) the same tax. A graduate tax
recognises the differential public expenditure in relation to higher education.
This is similar to an ICL system in that students do not face an upfront charge
when they enter higher education and so the credit constraint is removed;
however, there is no loan aspect in the design. Instead, the graduate tax acts
as a supplementary tax/compulsory payment on graduates throughout their
working life. In its simplest form this system may obligate graduates to pay a
fraction of their taxable income, in addition to income tax, to the government
until they retire (Barr, 1993). Although such a system can be designed to
incorporate an income contingent element (such as most income tax systems)
the key difference with the ICL stems from the fact there is no cost recovery
aspect to the graduate tax system with the likelihood that some individuals
may end up paying more than the cost of their education under this system of
graduate tax. A related point is that the amount graduates pay is invariant in
costs between degrees. As the graduate tax continues throughout the 
working life of the graduate it could act in the same way income tax does 
and be a disincentive to work. Also with a graduate tax system, as Green-
away and Haynes (2004) note, if the graduate tax is not hypothecated, 
higher education institutions would still be reliant on State finance and 
face the possible political obstacles that go with this. A graduate tax system
does have advantages in that it could be efficiently collected through the
income tax system and it has scope to raise considerable revenue for the
government. There are some administrative difficulties (albeit non-
insurmountable) also in linking income tax systems to higher education
systems, to define the potential tax base. Issues may arise also in terms of
graduates who have spent all or part of their studies overseas. Another
question may relate to whether the tax rate should differentiate between
different length or costs of tertiary education. However, the fact that a
graduate tax system has not been implemented anywhere in the world yet
suggests that the inefficiencies caused by the problems outlined above poses
questions about its viability. 
Both the finance options outlined above provide various merits in terms of
helping to place more of the financial burden upon the individual and 
away from the State, in removing the initial credit constraint an individual
may face when deciding to enter higher education and increasing efficiency
relative to a situation of free tuition fees. The next section outlines the
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within Ireland.
III METHODOLOGY
3.1  Microsimulation in Ex Ante Higher Education Policy Analysis
With the implementation of various forms of higher education finance
options in different countries over the past 20 years, numerous studies have
attempted to gauge their impact on a variety of issues, both from an ex ante
and ex post perspective. Although we have mentioned a number of ex post
studies that provided evaluations in terms of accessibility in the previous
section, the focus of the research conducted here is on the possible impact of
various student loan systems from an ex ante viewpoint. In an international
context, ex ante studies on higher education finance reform have relied mainly
upon microsimulation techniques for their analysis. 
Harding (1995) uses a dynamic microsimulation model of 4000 Australian
individuals to report the repayment profiles of males and females under the
Australian ICL system Higher Education Contribution Scheme (HECS) and
also the AUSTUDY supplement income-contingent scheme intended for
student maintenance purposes. Within this study it is assumed that each
individual completes four years of higher education and receives a tuition loan
similar to that of a full time student undertaking a standard course. There is
also the assumption that each student takes on the maximum amount of
AUSTUDY loan possible. The results show that 96 per cent of the total HECS
debt owed by males to the government was paid by the time they reach
retirement age, with 93 per cent of AUSTUDY debt paid in full by males over
the same time frame. These figures are lower for the female population with
77 per cent and 71 per cent of total debt due from the HECS and AUSTUDY
respectively from females being recouped by the government. Harding
concludes that the majority of students who do not fully pay off their debt do
manage to pay off a substantial amount of it and so the scheme is not fiscally
insecure from a government revenue point of view. Glennerster et al. (1995)
investigate the impact of an income contingent loan system and graduate tax
system on the repayment patterns of British graduates using the LIFEMOD
microsimulation model. They conclude that an ICL system is favourable over
the two, especially from an equity standpoint. Showing similar findings to the
Australian study, women on average pay back less than men with a range of
84 per cent to 22 per cent of male graduates paying their loan in full depending
on the assumptions surrounding earnings’ growth and the interest rate
attached to the student loan. This compares with a range of 61 per cent to 10
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assumptions surrounding the loan system. Goodman et al. (2002) estimate the
redistributional impact of the introduction of a graduate tax in the UK using
the tax-benefit microsimulation model TAXBEN. The study is conducted with
the aim of estimating the ‘overnight’ effect of the imposition of a graduate tax
in the UK and concludes that it may present some progressive qualities by
placing a greater burden on graduates from higher income deciles. Dearden et
al. (2007) use simulated lifetime earnings for graduates in England to analyse
the distributional effects of changes to the higher education finance system in
2006. A number of assumptions are imposed such as each graduate has taken
on three years of the maximum amount of debt allowed, both for tuition and
maintenance.10 Their results show that the reforms have a positive redistribu  -
tional impact, reducing the cost of higher education for those at the lower
income distribution.
Jacobs (2002) uses a similar methodology to simulate the life-cycle
earnings of a sample of Dutch graduates at a micro level in examining the
impact of a graduate tax or income contingent loan system. The study uses
data containing information on variations in enrolment length and type of
course pursued at the individual level in order to calculate the rate of graduate
tax necessary to cover all State education expenditure in the Netherlands. The
results show that a graduate tax scheme may exhibit a redistribution of
income from males to females and/or from high earning graduates to low
earning graduates. An income contingent loan system with risk sharing is also
analysed under various assumptions regarding the repayment rates and the
default risk to be levied on the student loans. The results show that repayment
periods averaged nearly 40 years under all assumptions and upwards of 50 per
cent of total debt remaining unpaid by retirement age which may raise
questions about the fiscal security involved, if the State is assumed to be the
lender in the scheme. 
Other papers such as Vodopivec (2004), Vandenberghe and Debande (2007)
and Migali (2010) do not explicitly employ microsimulation techniques in
simulating the impact of alternative finance structures. The first study
merges two datasets to simulate life-cycle earnings and employment patterns
for Slovenian graduates based on the work histories of a separate adult cohort
based upon gender, age and education level to help investigate the impact of
an income contingent loan system on government revenues. This finds that an
ICL system would be successful in recovering its outlays in Slovenia. The
second paper mentioned also investigates an ICL system from a fiscal
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data from each country to simulate age earnings profiles of graduates to
analyse the impact of a ICL system, again finding there is a significant fiscal
impact from the repayments of graduates. Migali (2010) compares mortgage
style student loan and ICL systems using a cross-sectional dataset of UK
graduates, where life-cycle earnings are produced by assuming that the
growth rate of graduate earnings throughout the life cycle follow a Brownian
motion and conclude that an ICL system may be beneficial for those with
lower earnings. However, unlike the studies utilising dynamic micro  -
simulation models these studies do not analyse the specific redistributional
impacts and/or the length of time to repayment involved with alternative
finance structures for higher education.
This paper utilises the Life-cycle Income Analysis Model (LIAM), a
dynamic microsimulation model for Ireland to investigate the potential impact
of the introduction of an income contingent loan system or a graduate tax
system within Ireland (O’Donoghue, 2010). The introduction of such a system
would entail an income transfer from one period to another as individuals
participating in higher education will have free access at point of entry but
must pay back the cost over his/her life cycle. To illustrate the potential impact
of such a system over the life cycle for Irish graduates, a dynamic
microsimulation model is seen as an appropriate methodological tool. Given
the important role of this microsimulation model in our estimations, we now
provide a brief overview of the specific simulation processes carried out in
forming LIAM. 
The LIAM model ages a sample of the Irish population, based upon the
Living in Ireland Survey data (1994-2001) up to 2050. The life-cycle processes
that are simulated include demographic processes such as mortality, fertility
and marriage, education, labour market processes such as employment and
unemployment and the simulation of incomes and interactions with the
tax/benefit system at the individual level. It accounts for new individuals
through simulated births and immigration and also allows for simulated death
and emigration, consistent with official population projections (CSO, 1999). It
thus maintains a representative sample of the population over time. 
Labour market status, including whether in work, unemployed, retired,
the type of employment if in work, earnings and other characteristics are also
modelled in the LIAM framework using a mixture of econometric models such
as logit models and standard OLS regressions. Education level, age and
parental education level are all important factors in determining the future
life histories of these variables within LIAM (O’Donoghue, 2010). 
The LIAM model also incorporates a static tax-benefit microsimulation
model of the Irish tax-benefit system. Using the information provided by
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to calculate disposable incomes, based on the parameters of the Irish tax-
benefit system and amounts using actual values for the period 1994-2006.
While the model does not explicitly incorporate the current economic crisis, as
this period will form a relatively short part of an individual’s life cycle, 
the qualitative conclusions between scenarios are robust. It must be
remembered that in using microsimulation models for scenario analysis, we
are not conducting forecasts, rather we utilise plausible distributions of
lifetime earnings patterns and compare the impact of alternative financing
mechan  isms on this distribution, rather than forecasting the impact which is
both beyond a methodology such as this and containing significant
uncertainty. 
The combination of the above processes provide a simulated future for the
entire population within the Living in Ireland Survey dataset up to 2050. The
education level completed of an individual in LIAM is disaggregated 
across four main headings, primary, lower secondary, upper secondary and
tertiary. No distinction is made between those that complete different forms of
tertiary education, such as degrees or diplomas or whether they attend a
university or institute of technology. LIAM does provide us with the life-cycle
earnings streams and employment patterns of each individual in our
population.11
Table 2 below illustrates the education-earnings profile of the population
and shows the data following an expected path, with higher educated
individuals earning more over their lifetime, and also males earning more
then females. For the analysis in this paper it is the life cycle of a particular
cohort that is of interest. We identify those that have completed upper
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Table 2: Present Value of Total Gross Life-cycle Earnings (€) across 
Education Level and Gender (All in Year 2000 Values) 
Gender  Education Level 
Lower Secondary  Upper Secondary  Tertiary 
Male 427,826  748,078  988,813 
Female 155,901  340,624  658,120 
Source: Author’s calculations LIAM.
Note: Earnings are assumed to grow by 2 per cent in real terms each year while a real
discount rate of 2 per cent is applied.
11 These earnings are scaled to 2000 prices with an assumption of the real earnings growth rate
equaling the real discount rate of 2 per cent, this follows the Irish government’s present
convention for discounting in public sector projects (Department of Finance, 2010).
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22nd year. We then track these individuals throughout their life cycle until the
point of retirement. As our simulated population runs from the years 2000 to
2050, this allows us to track the life cycle of eight cohorts of graduates until
their point of retirement. Figure 1 presents a picture of the simulated total
life-cycle earnings distribution for our sample discounted to year 2000.12 A
normal distribution plot within the figure illustrates the positively skewed
nature of the earnings, providing comparison with similarly skewed earnings
distribution studies on simulated graduate populations (Dearden et al., 2007).
Figure 2 below presents the simulated average earnings for males and females
graduates within LIAM throughout the life cycle. The simulations suggest
that earnings rise from around €15,000 for men and women to a peak of
around €62,000 (€32,000) for males (females) at age 57 (56). It must be noted
that these figures are in constant year 2000 prices. The drop in both male and
female earnings seen in figure as the simulated population moves towards age
60 is due to a large proportion of individuals in the higher earnings
distribution retiring as they reach age 60, while those in the lower end
continue to work until age 65. As we are interested in analysing the impact of
alternative higher education finance systems within this framework, we must
now specify the exact parameter of the systems to be simulated.
3.2  Specification of ICL and Graduate Tax System Within LIAM
In this section we describe in practice how the two alternative higher
education finance structures are simulated within LIAM.
With the LIAM model disaggregating education level completed across
four main headings, it prohibits simulating different loan amounts to different
individuals based upon course choice. It also prohibits looking at differences
across part-time or full-time study.13 For the purposes of this analysis, these
individuals were assumed to have completed 4 years of full-time tertiary
education between the ages of 19 and 22 inclusive, and in the context of an ICL
system to have received, during each of those years’ loans of €2,500 per annum
(in 2000 prices).14 Therefore, each graduate is assumed to incur a debt of
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Figure 1: Simulated Present Value Life-cycle Earnings Distribution for
Graduates Within LIAM (All in Year 2000 Prices)
Source: Author’s calculation LIAM.
Note: Total life-cycle earnings for an individual is the sum of earnings from ages 22-65
with an assumption of 2 per cent real growth in earnings per annum and a 2 per cent
real discount applied.
Figure 2: Simulated Mean Annual Earnings for Male and Female Graduates
within LIAM from Ages 22-65 (All in Year 2000 Prices)
Source: Author’s calculation LIAM.
Note: Earnings are subject to the assumption of 2 per cent real growth in earnings per
annum and a 2 per cent real discount applied.
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€10,000 by the end of his/her stay in higher education. We assume payment
begins as soon as they graduate with no grace period. We also initially 
assume there is no interest rate on the loan, but the principle is scaled 
every year by the increase in inflation,15 in other words there is a zero real
interest rate attached to the loan. We also assume that there is no scope 
for early repayment in the system and there is no system for tracking
emigrants. 
We investigate repayment of this simulated debt under two systems, the
first of which is an income contingent loan system. We set the income
threshold as the average income of those working for pay in our population for
any given year. Any individual whose taxable income is below this threshold
in a given year does not have to repay any amount in that year.16 This suggests
an equitable income threshold as any graduate above this level can be said to
be gaining some premium from higher education in the form of higher
earnings. Individuals will pay 10 per cent of any income earned above this
threshold to service their loan. Also to incorporate more progressivity in the
system, we also set a second threshold at 1.25 times the average income of
those working for pay in our population for any given year. If an individual
earns more than this they must pay 5 per cent on any income earned above
this second threshold as well as 10 per cent on all income above the first (lower
threshold).17 The assumption is also made that these amounts are blanket
thresholds at the individual level, with no allowances for number of children
and/or spouse income or parental income level. Repayment stops once the loan
amount has been repaid in full or when retirement is reached. 
This is in contrast to the graduate tax whereby repayments continue until
the age of retirement regardless of how much is paid back with the result that
high earnings may repay more than they have borrowed. In this paper we
apply this graduate tax through the social insurance contributions system,18
with graduates forced to pay an additional 1 per cent on their pay related
social insurance (PRSI) contributions until they retire. This applies to all
classes of PRSI and has a progressive element in its design as the more an
individual earns, the more they pay. We assume that this follows all the other
rules surrounding PRSI contributions such as the PRSI ceiling. 
15 This is assumed to be 2 per cent per annum as per current government projections, we then
apply a real discount rate of 2 per cent in obtaining the present value for the year 2000. 
16 This is similar to the design of the original Australian ICL system. 
17 While these repayment rates are chosen somewhat arbitrarily, they are based loosely upon the
repayment rates that currently exist in the UK.
18 A graduate tax system through PRSI contributions in Ireland has been put forward by the main
opposition party at the time of writing.
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simulation module upon the simulated future population of Ireland. This
maps all taxes, social contributions and benefits incurred/received by our
simulated population for the years 2000-2050. The introduction of the two
finance systems outlined above is achieved by inserting them into the
tax/benefit microsimulation module. This allows us to track at an individual
level, the scope and scale of both systems mentioned above. As we do not have
the tax/benefit rules for all future years, we initially vary the tax/benefit rules
reflecting the real world from 2000-2006 for Ireland. We then hold the 2006
tax/benefit rules constant for the rest of the simulated future. As our input
data from LIAM is in 2000 prices, earnings and any other income variables
that influence tax/benefit situations are up rated to the corresponding
tax/benefit year, before applying the tax/benefit module. The relevant
variables for the all years beyond 2006 are up rated to the 2006 level and as
they are subject to the 2006 tax/benefit rules. All output from this process are
then converted back to 2000 prices.
IV  EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
The results of simulating two alternative higher education finance
systems for Ireland using the LIAM dynamic microsimulation model will be
analysed in terms of repayment patterns, redistributional issues and from a
fiscal viewpoint. When analysing these figures it is important to note that they
are quite sensitive to changes in the assumptions surrounding the
simulations. Changing the assumptions regarding the loan amount, earnings
growth and repayment structures within our model may drive these results in
a different direction, however, we will provide an analysis based on the
assumptions set out previously and also with varying assumptions
surrounding the level of interest charged on the loans and the rate at which
the graduate tax is levied.19
4.1 ICL
For the ICL system simulated, Table 3 indicates that for males, 82 per cent
of graduates pay back their loan in full when a zero real interest rate is
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19 Some sensitivity analysis on the assumed discount rate applied is also presented in Appendix
A of the paper but not discussed at length within the empirical results. The main point of note, as
seen in Table A1 of Appendix A, is that increasing the real discount rate by 1 per cent does not
affect the length of repayment of the income contingent loan but does have a significant impact
upon the net present value amount the student repays under the ICL system. With respect to the
graduate tax system, a 1 per cent change in the real discount rate does little to impact the amount
repaid relative to the simulated loan.
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applied to the debt. We also see that there is a substantial gap across gender
in terms of those who repay their debt in full with 74 per cent of females doing
so, compared to 89 per cent of male graduates. These figures are slightly below
that of the simulations presented by Harding (1995) for the Australian system.
She finds that by the age of retirement, 96 per cent of males and 77 per cent
of females have paid their tuition related loans. This may stem from the fact
that the individuals in the Australian system pay a fraction of all taxable
income after they reach a certain threshold, rather then just a fraction of
income earned above this threshold. Our simulated repayment rates are above
those found in Glennerster et al. (1995) with respect to females as they find 62
per cent of British females may repay back their loan in their simulated ICL
system.20 The male repayment rate of 84 per cent they find is also below the
findings of our simulations.
Males that do pay off their debt in full do so in an average of 14 years when
the assumption of a zero real interest rate is applied, while females take 16
Table 3: Repayment Patterns for Graduates by Gender under an Income
Contingent Loan System for Ireland with Two Different Interest Rates 
(Debt of €10,000)
Percentage  Average   Average NPV Average 
of Borrowers  Repayment of Repayments  Subsidy as a 
who Repay Period in  (€) Percentage
in Full Years of Loan 
%%
0% Real Interest Rate 
Females  74  15.9 5,904 41.0
Males  89  14.4 7,046 29.5 
Total Average  82  15.0  6,477  35.2 
2% Real Interest Rate
Females 63 16.2 7,300 27.0
Males 85 15.4 8,976 10.2
Total Average 74 15.7 8,141 18.6
Source: Author’s calculations LIAM.
Note: The average repayment period includes only those that had paid their loan in full.
Note: The NPV of repayments are repayments discounted to the year of graduation of
each graduate. 
20 This is under the assumption of 3 per cent real earnings growth and 0 per cent real interest rate
on the loan.
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simulations where males and females take on average 12 and 15 years
respectively. While for the UK, Glennerster et al. (1995) simulated 16 years
and 22 years as the mean repayment period for males and females
respectively. Dearden et al. (2007) find that a variant of the UK system may
bring down these figures for the UK, with the number of years taken to repay
the full debt at 13 and 17 years for males and females. Our repayment period
may be undesirable from a policy perspective as this represents a considerable
time for the government/university to wait for the full benefits of debt
repayment to be fulfilled. In the context of males versus female repayment
patterns our results are not surprising given the fact females generally earn
less across the life cycle, are more likely to leave the labour market and/or
work part time than their male counterparts.
Another area of interest with regard to the simulated ICL system is the
level of subsidy provided by the government due to assumptions of the
cancellation of the debt upon retirement and the level of interest charged on
the loan. This is measured in Table 3 using the average net present value
(NPV) of the repayments made by graduates compared to the initial loan of
€10,000 the graduates receive. We can see that under the assumption of a zero
real interest rate the average subsidy as a percentage of the original loan
amount is 35 per cent. This figure arguably represents quite a generous
subsidy towards the graduate and is a figure higher than that estimated for
the UK system by Dearden et al. (2007). Barr (2005) and Barr and Falkingham
(1996) argue that the interest subsidies to graduates within an ICL system
from applying a zero real interest to the loan are particularly expensive, and
given the government is the most likely source of ICL student loan system,
this subsidy represents a large burden upon the taxpayer. The results
presented in Table 3 show that the ICL system simulated for Ireland here
would seem to back up their findings. 
Table 3 also provides some insight with an assumption of a 2 per cent 
real interest rate applied to the student loan provided. It is shown that the
proportion of graduates that repay the debt in full drops to 74 per cent, with
relatively equal drops in the proportion of those repaying the debt in full
across gender. However, the imposition of the higher real interest rate does not
have a major impact upon the average length of repayment for those that do
pay off the loan in full by retirement age. With regard to the average loan
subsidy to graduates provided by the government, the imposition of a 2 per
cent real interest rate on the loan substantially reduces this relative to that
seen with a zero real interest rate. Again comparing the NPV of average
repayments to the initial €10,000 loan provided shows that the average
subsidy as a percentage of this loan falls to 18.6 per cent, down from the figure
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of over 35 per cent seen previously with the zero real interest rate.21 This
would seem to support the claims of Barr (2005) that the level of the interest
rate applied on any ICL system is vital in terms of the expense imposed upon
the taxpayer. Our results suggest that within the system simulated here, an
interest rate on the debt that corresponds to a real interest rate of 2 per cent
is extremely effective in reducing this subsidy, compared to a situation of zero
real interest rates. 
From a distributional point of view, we analyse the repayment patterns
across deciles of the life-cycle earnings distribution of graduates and across
the two variants regarding the assumption of the interest rate charged upon
the student loan. From Table 4 below, we can see that as a result of the income
contingent nature of the system, our simulated ICL system seems to hold
progressive qualities. 
With a system of zero real interest rates, our results shows that 48 per
cent of those in the lowest life-cycle earnings decile end up paying back the full
amount of their debt, compared to a figure of 100 per cent of those in the
highest income decile. We also see that the largest subsidy of the loan is also
provided to those at the lower income deciles as they pay back the lowest
amount on average (in NPV terms). However, it is also noticeable that the
subsidy still exists for those at the higher end of the graduate income
distribution, standing at nearly 12 per cent of the original loan amount. 
When the assumption regarding the real interest rate charged upon the
loan is varied the system would still seem to hold its progressive nature.
Although the amount repaid increases and the level of subsidy granted
towards those in the lowest income decile falls, the subsidy to the higher
earning graduates falls to zero while there still remains a substantial subsidy
to the graduates at the bottom of the income distribution. 
An analysis of the ICL system simulated under both variants with respect
to the level of interest rates suggests that the highest proportion of the loan
21 An intuitive example may help illustrate the sensitivity of the NPV of the amount repaid to the
real interest rate. For simplicity, we assume that upon graduation an individual has €10,000
worth of debt that is owed to the State with a zero real interest rate. This person finds
employment upon graduation and on average pays off €1,000 of his/her debt each year. After 10
years this individual will have cleared their debt, however the NPV of these repayments will only
be €8,200 (with a real discount rate of 2 per cent as we assume above). So, in effect the State will
receive €8,200 in return for €10,000 as they have not charged a real interest rate, thus providing
an implicit 18 per cent subsidy to the graduate. On the other hand if the State had charged the
debt with a 2 per cent real interest rate (upon the principal), after 10 years of similar annual
repayments the individual would still owe the State €2,200 (or €1,800 in present value terms).
The individual would continue repayments for roughly another 3 years. By this stage they will
have paid back €13,000 in real terms but circa €10,000 in net present value terms, so the
government will receive €10,000 back from the initial €10,000 debt in present value terms and
the implicit subsidy from the real interest rate applied goes to 0. 
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through higher life-cycle earnings. Therefore, it could be suggested that the
system simulated here satisfies both the equity and efficiency arguments
surrounding higher education as nobody faces an upfront charge when
entering higher education under this system and those that do not see their
life-cycle earnings benefit substantially from higher education do not pay
substantially towards its cost. 
256 THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL REVIEW
Table 4: Repayment Patterns for Graduates by Decile of Graduate Life-cycle
Earnings Distribution Under an Income Contingent Loan System for Ireland
with Varying Interest Rates (Debt of €10,000)
Decile Percentage   Average  Average NPV  Average
of Borrowers  Repayment of Repayments Subsidy as a
who Repay Period in  (€) Percentage
in Full Years of Loan
%%
Real Interest Rate = 0%
1 48 25.5 3,725 62.7
2 48 20.0 3,971 60.3
3 78 22.5 5,445 45.5
4 87 19.9 6,070 36.8
5 84 19.2 6,249 37.5
6 92 16.0 6,944 30.5
7 88 12.52 7,888 20.1
8 100.0 8.1 7,775 22.2
9 100.0 8.8 8,457 15.5
10 100.0 6.8 8,778 12.2
Real Interest Rate = 2%
1 29 23.0 4,545 54.5
2 31 19.75 4,935 50.6
3 61 24.7 7,579 24.3
4 72 23.0 8,230 17.7
5 76 21.5 8,415 15.8
6 85 17.6 9,195 8.0
7 88 14.6 9,051 9.15
8 100 9.2 10,000 0.0
9 100 9.6 10,000 0.0
10 100 7.5 10,000 0.0
Source: Author’s calculations LIAM.
Note: The average repayment period includes only those that had paid their loan in full.
Note: The NPV of repayments are repayments discounted to the year of graduation of
each graduate. 
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4.2  Graduate Tax
We have also simulated a graduate tax scheme for Ireland to be
implemented through the social insurance system. As a graduate tax system
does not involve any loan, we do not examine this in terms of repayment rates
or length of repayments. Instead we investigate the yield of such a scheme
relative to the ICL system seen before. We investigate this under two different
graduate tax rates and also with varying simulated debt amounts due to
variations in the real interest rate surrounding the ICL system outlined
earlier. 
From Table 5a we see that a graduate tax system of an extra 1 per cent on
PRSI contributions would repay 135 per cent of total borrowing under the
assumption of a zero real interest rate on the debt. This is compared to just
under 65 per cent of all debt recovered from the ICL system under the same
assumption. A graduate tax system involving an extra 2 per cent of PRSI
contributions would yield 267 per cent of the total loan liability with the same
interest rates involved.
When the interest rate applied to the graduate debt is varied the yield 
of various graduate tax rates also varies. This is seen with Table 5b, where 
a 1 per cent graduate tax scheme would yield only 60 per cent of simulated
Table 5a: Graduate Tax Revenue as a Percentage of Total Simulated Loan
Liability with Zero Real Interest Rate
Yield of 1 Per Cent   Yield of 2 Per Cent 
Graduate Tax Graduate Tax
Females 118.6 236.0
Males 152.2 299.6
Total Average 135.4 267.9
Source: Author’s calculations LIAM.
Table 5b: Graduate Tax Revenue as a Percentage of Total Simulated Loan
Liability with 2 Per Cent Real Interest Rate
Yield of 1 Per Cent   Yield of 2 Per Cent 
Graduate Tax Graduate Tax
Females 52.3 104.0
Males 67.4 132.5
Total Average 60.0 118.3
Source: Author’s calculations LIAM.
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loans. The simple reason for this is that while the amount taken in from the
graduate tax does not change, the simulated debt will be higher. When the
graduate tax system involves an extra 2 per cent on PRSI contributions 
with the same interest rate, the yield is shown as 118 per cent of simulated
debt. 
To gauge the implications of both graduate tax schemes against the
original debt received by the graduate it is the results in Table 5b that are of
relevance. This provides the equivalent of estimating the yield of both
graduate tax systems as a percentage of the original loan amount graduates
get22 and our results show that no government subsidy would be required
under a 2 per cent graduate tax scheme, while some substantial government
subsidy would still exist under a 1 per cent scheme.
Comparing the results in Table 6 with Table 4, we see that with the
exception of graduates in the bottom two income deciles within a 1 per cent
graduate tax scheme, relative to a ICL system with a 2 per cent real interest
rate, all income levels pay more under the graduate tax system than the ICL.
However,  the majority of the burden falls on those that earn the most over
their life cycle. This gives rise to the situation where richer graduates repay
more than they would have borrowed under an ICL scheme and hence
contribute to the education costs of poorer students. Although this type of
system does have its advantages in terms of the revenue generated,
Glennester et al. (1995) find a similar result and argue against this from an
equity point of view. They suggest that cost of higher education for poorer
students should not fall on the richer graduates but on the taxpayer, similar
to any other redistributive measure. They also suggest that as the revenue
from a graduate tax system may go to the State and not directly to higher
education institutions, the benefits of such a system may not be accrued to
educational resources. 
4.3  Implications of Increasing Graduate Emigration
With Ireland currently experiencing its worst economic crisis in recent
history, labour market opportunities have tightened significantly. This is
especially true for young people in Ireland, with unemployment rates of 26 per
cent and 16.5 per cent for those aged 20-24 and 25-29 respectively (CSO, 2011).
The weakness in the labour market has led to a rise in emigration from
Ireland, particularly by those aged under 25. Third level graduates have
formed a significant part of this increase with the latest figures (based upon
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with a 2 per cent real discount rate will give the same NPV of the debt as the original amount
borrowed.
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2008 graduates) showing that 10 per cent of new graduates are working
abroad, with this figure expected to be higher for subsequent years (HEA,
2010). While the LIAM model used within our estimations does account for
emigration, the assumptions surrounding the simulated emigration are based
upon projections from the year 2001. While the projections incorporate a
revision in terms of increased emigration, current emigration projections,
especially for third level graduates, are higher. These changes could have an
impact upon our estimates of repayment patterns by Irish graduates. To
account for this possibility we simulate a significant rise in graduate
emigration from Ireland within our model and observe the new pattern of
repayments that occurs. 
Table 6: Average Amount Paid by Graduates by Retirement Age under a
Graduate Tax System of by Decile of Life-cycle Earnings Distribution and
Varying Tax Rates 
Decile of Life-cycle Earnings Distribution Average NPV of Repayments (€) 






















Source: Author’s calculations LIAM.
Note: The NPV of repayments are repayments discounted to the year of graduation of
each graduate.
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with this sub sample picked completely at random.23 The impact upon income
contingent loan repayment patterns is assumed to possibly follow two
different paths. The first is where those that emigrate pay nothing back
towards the debt they owe. The results of this are presented in Table 7a below
for scenarios with zero and 2 per cent real interest rates respectively. If these
results are compared to the original results presented in Table 3 we see that
the simulated emigration has a significant effect on all aspects of repayment.
The average proportion of graduates that repay their debt in full falls from 82
per cent to 65 per cent under a system of zero real interest rates while the
average State subsidy rises from 35 per cent to 48 per cent with the same
interest rate applied. Similar results are seen with respect to the ICL system
with a 2 per cent real interest rate applied. Given that graduate emigration is
expected to remain high in Ireland for the foreseeable future, our results
would suggest that the introduction of an ICL system in Ireland must attempt
to address the issue of repayment by graduates that leave the country.
The HEA (2009) have acknowledged the issue of graduate emigration
within the design of an ICL system and point to countries such as the UK and
Australia that employ mechanisms such as a requirement to notify the lending
agency before emigration with an agreement of a new schedule for repayments
and penalties if scheduled repayments are not met within their ICL systems.
Therefore, if an ICL system is introduced in Ireland it is likely that some form
of disincentive similar to these would have to be introduced to avoid zero
repayment from graduate emigrants. We, therefore, also analyse the impact
upon income contingent loan repayment patterns where repayment from
emigrants does occur. As this is an ex ante study we rely on external statistics
to estimate the probability of repayment by graduates that emigrate. This is
achieved using figures from the UK that indicate that of those graduates that
emigrate after completing third level college, an average 40 per cent are
making repayments at any one time24 (Student Loan, Company, 2011). Given
this, we assume in our model that in any one period, 40 per cent of those
randomly chosen to emigrate within our sample continue repayments on their
debt to the same level as they would have living and working in Ireland. The
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23 The figure of 20 per cent is chosen somewhat arbitrarily as no official projections can be found.
However, this was the rate of graduate emigration in Ireland in the late 1980s (Murray and
Wickham, 1990), when overall emigration was previously at such high levels as those seen today
and so may be seen as somewhat robust. 
24 This figure is based upon the average proportion of UK graduates that are overseas and making
repayments on their student debt over the period 2000-2009. The rest of those overseas are either
under the income threshold to begin repayments (42 per cent, or have fallen into arrears on their
debt (18 per cent).
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Table 7a: Repayment Patterns for Graduates by Gender Under an Income
Contingent Loan System for Ireland with Two Different Interest Rates and
Simulated Graduate Emigration with No Repayment (Debt of €10,000)
Percentage Average  Average NPV Average 
of Borrowers Repayment of Repayments Subsidy as a
Who Repay Period  (€) Percentage
in Full (%) in Years of Loan (%)
0% Real Interest Rate 
Females  60 15.1 4,889 51.1
Males  71 14.8 5,457 45.4
Total Average  65 14.9  5,179 48.2%
2% Real Interest Rate
Females 50 16.6 5,901 41.0
Males 69 14.4 7,315 26.8
Total Average 60 15.3 6,611 33.9
Source: Author’s calculations LIAM.
Note: The average repayment period includes only those that had paid their loan in full.
Note: The NPV of repayments are repayments discounted to the year of graduation of
each graduate.
Table 7b: Repayment Patterns for Graduates by Gender under an Income
Contingent Loan System for Ireland with Two Different Interest Rates and
Simulated Graduate Emigration with Some Repayment (Debt of €10,000)
Percentage Average  Average NPV Average 
of Borrowers Repayment of Repayments Subsidy as a
Who Repay Period  (€) Percentage
in Full (%) in Years of Loan (%)
0% Real Interest Rate 
Females  66 16.2 5,328 46.7
Males  82 14.2 6,482 35.2
Total Average 75 15.1 5,907 40.1
2% Real Interest Rate
Females 57 16.0 6,652 33.5
Males 77 15.4 8,167 18.3
Total Average 67 15.6 7,413 25.9
Source: Author’s calculations LIAM.
Note: The average repayment period includes only those that had paid their loan in full.
Note: The NPV of repayments are repayments discounted to the year of graduation of
each graduate.
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by levels of real interest rate. In comparing Tables 7a and 7b we see that the
results indicate that incorporating some repayment from emigrants does
significantly reduce the State subsidy relative to the situation of no
repayment, the average State subsidy falls from 48 per cent to 40 per cent
under a zero real interest rate system. However, when compared to the results
of Table 3 we still find that emigration has a significant effect on the
proportion of borrowers that pay their debt in full and the average State
subsidy provided, suggesting that graduate emigration may still be a problem
in terms of debt recovery if an ICL system is introduced in Ireland. 
For the impact of increased emigration upon the simulated graduate tax
system, it is assumed that no repayment ever occurs from graduates that
emigrate. This is due to the fact that the simulated graduate tax system in this
study is designed to generate revenue through the Irish social insurance
system and graduates that leave third level education under this system do so
without any specific amount of debt to repay. The results of the simulated 20
per cent graduate emigration rate upon graduate tax revenue levels are
presented in Tables 8a and 8b and are presented in a similar manner to Tables
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Table 8a: Graduate Tax Revenue as a Percentage of Total Simulated Loan
Liability with Zero Real Interest Rate and Simulated Graduate Emigration
Yield of 1 Per Cent  Yield of 2 Per Cent 
Graduate Tax  Graduate Tax
Females 97.1 201.8
Males 119.9 243.3
Total Average 108.5 222.6
Source: Author’s calculations LIAM.
Table 8b: Graduate Tax Revenue as a Percentage of Total Simulated Loan
Liability with 2 Per Cent Real Interest Rate and Simulated Graduate
Emigration
Yield of 1 Per Cent  Yield of 2 Per Cent 
Graduate Tax  Graduate Tax
Females 42.7 81.6
Males 55.2 1.09
Total Average 49.0 95.6
Source: Author’s calculations LIAM.
01 Flannery article_ESRI Vol 42-3  16/09/2011  09:58  Page 262THE LIFE-CYCLE IMPACT OF HIGHER EDUCATION FINANCE SYSTEMS 263
5a and 5b, showing the yield of such a scheme relative to the ICL system,
under two different graduate tax rates and also with varying simulated debt
amounts due to variations in the real interest rate surrounding the ICL
system. We predictably find that graduate emigration has a negative and
significant impact upon revenues generated from a graduate tax system. The
results show that a 1 per cent graduate tax system now repays 108 per cent of
total borrowing under the assumption of a zero real interest rate on the debt,
compared with 135 per cent with lower emigration. Also, a graduate tax
system involving an extra 2 per cent of PRSI contributions would now yield
222 per cent of the total loan liability compared with a figure of 267 per cent
seen earlier with the same interest rates involved. Similar revenue falls are
seen when the interest rate applied to the graduate debt is changed to 2 per
cent. Despite the simulated graduate emigration forcing revenue downward,
our results indicate that the graduate tax system still remains largely fiscally
viable and attractive relative to an ICL system. However, as it is the graduates
that are left in Ireland that are essentially paying for the education of those
that leave the country, such a situation may bring about considerable moral
hazard issues, leading to even greater graduate emigration, thus further
reducing the potential revenue generated. 
V CONCLUSION
With increasing numbers of young people participating in higher
education in Ireland and a heavy reliance of higher education institutions on
State funding, the introduction of an alternative finance system for Ireland
has been muted over the past number of years. However, no study has been
conducted to gauge the potential impact of such measures. In this paper we
utilise the dynamic microsimulation model LIAM to simulate the impact of
both an income contingent loan system (ICL) and a graduate tax system from
a fiscal and redistributional viewpoint and to analyse the repayment length
under the former system. Under the ICL system we set a threshold based upon
the average income of those working for pay in our population for any given
year and find that 82 per cent of graduates would pay back their loan in 
full by the age of retirement with a zero real interest rate attached to the
repayments of students. This represents a slightly lower figure than studies
conducted in Australia and is broadly in line with simulations conducted for
the UK. We also find that the average subsidy provided to graduates by 
the zero real interest rate attached under this is quite generous and may be
fiscally expensive. We also perform some sensitivity analysis with regard 
to the assumption surrounding the real interest rate attached to the loans
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from a fiscal viewpoint, while still holding progressive qualities. It must 
again be noted that these figures can be quite sensitive to changes in the
various other assumptions underlying the ICL system we specifically
simulated. 
From a distributional point of view we see that under the ICL schemes
with both a zero and 2 per cent real interest rate, those from the lower deciles
of the life-cycle earnings distribution pay the least, and so the system does
exhibit some degree of progressivity. However, from a policy perspective the
low amount of the total debt repaid may suggest that any ICL system to be
introduced may benefit from having a positive real interest rate attached.
With the two variations of a graduate tax scheme simulated within the
social insurance contributions of graduates we also find evidence of
progressivity with those that earn the least over their life cycle paying the
least. However, our results also show that under the graduate tax scheme
where an extra 1 per cent is added to PRSI contributions, graduates on
average pay back 1.35 times the amount they may have borrowed under an
ICL system with a zero real interest rate. We again perform some sensitive
tests here and find varying the extra percentage added to PRSI contributions
as part of the graduate tax can vary this measure considerably. Our analysis
suggests that a graduate tax scheme may have advantages over an ICL system
in terms of the revenues it generates for the State, however, it does entail that
richer graduates will pay for the education of poorer individuals. We also
investigate the potential impact of an increase in graduate emigration upon
repayment patterns and find that State subsidies towards an ICL system may
increase significantly under such circumstances, even with a mechanism in
place to facilitate repayments from graduates overseas. Our results also
indicate that our simulated graduate tax system may still be fiscally attractive
with increased graduate emigration, but the unknown moral hazard effects
may negate any strong policy conclusions to be made from this.
The progressive nature of both higher finance systems may entail that the
removal of the current higher education finance system in Ireland and the
introduction of either system discussed above may prove to be a type of
redistributive policy tool. With both systems there is free point of entry to
higher education and mechanisms in place to ensure that those that see the
lowest return from that education pay the least for it. Under the current
system, each individual pays the same regardless of future benefit received.
When investigating the impact of non-cash transfers on income inequalities
Callan  et al. (2007) show the negative impact of State higher education
transfers upon income inequality currently within Ireland. Under a system of
ICL or graduate tax this may be reduced as those with the lowest income
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would receive the greatest State transfer. However, the progressive nature of
repayments within both systems may bring about an issue of moral hazard
within graduates employment choices. With repayments in both systems
dependent on work income, the introduction of both systems may act as a
disincentive to work and also graduates may be more inclined to choose jobs
with non-income benefits. This may be especially true if a graduate tax system
is in place, as repayments are on-going throughout the life cycle and do not
end with the debt repaid. 
The paper does not investigate the impacts of such systems upon
participation rates and administrative costs of the alternative systems. With
the former, while evidence from the UK and Australia indicate no major
impact upon participation rates with the introduction of an ICL system,
research such as Hryshko, Luendo-Prado and Sorenson (2011) and Burdman
(2005) suggests that individuals from more disadvantaged backgrounds are
more likely to be financially risk adverse and thus may alter their education
participation decision if a loan system is implemented. This could then worsen
the negative distributional consequences of uneven participation from various
socio-economic groups in higher education. With respect to administrative
costs, Chapman (2005) notes that in countries that have adopted alternative
higher education finance systems, the administrative costs have been
inexpensive relative to potential revenue generated. Despite these constraints,
this paper does provide the first step in measuring the possible impact of
alternative higher education finance structures in Ireland. The LIAM model
could be utilised in the future to simulate variants of the systems proposed
here to attempt to find an optimal system from an equitable and efficiency
viewpoint.
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APPENDIX A: 
Sensitivity Analysis with Respect to the Discount Rate – Repayment Patterns
for Graduates by Gender under an Income Contingent 
Table A1: Loan System for Ireland with Two Different Interest Rates and
Real Discount Rate of 3 Per Cent (Debt of €10,000)
Percentage Average  Average NPV Average 
of Borrowers Repayment of Repayments Subsidy as a
Who Repay Period  (€) Percentage
in Full in Years of Loan
%%
0% Real Interest Rate 
Females  74 15.9 5,109  49.0
Males  89 14.4 6,210  37.9
Total Average 82 15.0 5,662 43.4
2% Real Interest Rate
Females 63 16.2 6,068 39.3
Males 85 15.4 7,661 23.4
Total Average 74 15.7 6,868 31.3
Source: Author’s calculations LIAM.
Note: The average repayment period includes only those that had paid their loan in full.
Note: The NPV of repayments are repayments discounted to the year of graduation of
each graduate.
01 Flannery article_ESRI Vol 42-3  16/09/2011  09:58  Page 269Table A2a: Graduate Tax as a Percentage of Total Simulated Loan Liability
with Zero Real Interest Rate and Real Discount Rate of 3 Per Cent
Yield of 1 Per Cent  Yield of 2 Per Cent 
Graduate Tax  Graduate Tax
Females 117.6 234.1
Males 151.0 297.3
Total Average 134.4 265.8
Source: Author’s calculations LIAM.
Table A2b: Graduate Tax as a Percentage of Total Simulated Loan Liability
with 2 Per Cent Real Interest Rate and Real Discount Rate of 3 Per Cent
Yield of 1 Per Cent  Yield of 2 Per Cent 
Graduate Tax  Graduate Tax
Females 52.3 104.0
Males 67.3 132.5
Total Average 60.0 118.3
Source: Author’s Calculations LIAM.
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